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Tanyi, Attila (2012), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Philosophia, OnlineFirst Zusammenfassung: In an overlooked section of his influential book What We Owe to Each Other Thomas Scanlon advances an argument against the desire-model of practical reasoning. In Scanlon’s view the model gives a distorted picture of the structure of our practical thinking. His idea is that there is an alternative to the “weighing behavior” of reasons, a particular way in which reasons can relate to each other. This phenomenon, which the paper calls “silencing”, is not something that the desire-model can accommodate, or so Scanlon argues. The paper first presents and interprets Scanlon’s challenge. After this, the paper argues, through the examination of three responses, that Scanlon is right in claiming that the model cannot accommodate the phenomenon as he describes it. However, the paper further argues that there is no need to accept Scanlon’s depiction of silencing: advocates of the model can give an alternative account of what happens in cases of silencing that is just as plausible as Scanlon’s own. Scanlon’s challenge is thus, the paper concludes, illegitimate. Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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Engelen, Eva-Maria; Röttger-Rössler, Birgitt (2012), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Emotion Review ; 4 (2012), 1. - S. 3-8 Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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Mittelstrass, Juergen (2012), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Rendiconti Lincei ; 23 (2012), 1, Suppl. - S. 29-33 Zusammenfassung: Science is not only a particular kind of knowledge formation defined by theories, methods and special criteria of rationality to which theories and methods are subjected, and an institution, that is the social form in which science is realised as a particular kind of knowledge formation, but it also has a moral form. With regard to this moral form, science is not only methodically enlightened rationality, or a means to differentiate and stabilise the social organization of consumption and the satisfaction of needs, but is also an idea that relates to the second nature of man, that is, it is his epistemic or rational nature, or, better still, his form of life. This is shown by the fact that falsehood and deceit also have their place in science. With respect to these kinds of ethical problems, the ethics of science or the ethics in science has to deal with principles governing the relation between research and its application, with principles of the internal ethical essence of research, and with principles which constitute an ethos in science and its institutions, nowadays often expressed in so-called codes of conduct. That an ethos in science is often not observed is the reason why the attention of science as an institution towards the observance of the scientist’s ethos should be more strongly enforced in the future, also in order to overcome a certain crisis of confidence both with and within the sciences. Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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Engelen, Eva-Maria (2012), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft : ZfE ; 15 (2012), Suppl. 1. - S. 41-52 Zusammenfassung: Um die Emotionen und Gefühle der anderen verstehen und nachempfinden zu können, müssen die eigenen emotionalen Anlagen geformt, d. h. gebildet worden sein. Letzteres kann nur im sozialen Miteinander geschehen. Die Möglichkeit zu sozialer Orientierung im Verstehen der emotionalen Befindlichkeiten des Anderen setzt also voraus, dass eine Bildung der Gefühle von der Geburt an erfolgt ist. Das „sich selbst verstehen Lernen“ als empfindendes Individuum geht auf erfolgreiche Semantisierung der emotionalen Prozesse zurück, die von den ersten Tagen nach der Geburt an erfolgt und als eine Bildung der Gefühle bezeichnet werden kann. Letzteres ist nicht nur eine Voraussetzung dafür, dass man sich selbst verstehen lernt, sondern zugleich eine dafür, dass man lernt, nachzuempfinden, wie es anderen geht und sein soziales Umfeld versteht. Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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Stemmer, Peter (2012), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Ersch. in: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung ; 66 (2012), 2. - S. 187-217 Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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Erschienen in: Vernunft und Freiheit : zur praktischen Philosophie von Julian Nida-Rümelin / hrsg. von Dieter Sturma. - Berlin; Boston : De Gruyter, 2012. - S. 71-90. - ISBN 978-3-11-021499-4 Zusammenfassung: The paper pleads for compatibilism by distinguishing the first-person s normative and the observer s empirical perspective. In the normative perspective one s own actions are uncaused and free, in the empirical perspective they are caused and may be predetermined. Still, there is only one notion of causation that is able to account for the relation between the causal conceptions within the two perspectives. The other main idea for explicating free will by explaining free actions or intentions as appropriately caused in a specified way is acknowledged, but not discussed. The paper finally argues that the normative and the empirical perspective are on a par; none is prior; even from within the empirical perspective the normative perspective is ineliminable. Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 1
Spohn_3.pdf (204.1Kb) -
Mittelstrass, Juergen (2012), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Zeitschrift für Hochschulrecht, Hochschulmanagement und Hochschulpolitik : zfhr ; 11 (2012), 1. - S. 24-31 Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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Rosefeldt, Tobias (2011), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Publ. in: Grazer Philosophische Studien ; 82 (2011). - S. 329-351 Zusammenfassung: The paper tries to shed new exegetical light on Frege’s “Dialogue with Pünjer on Existence” by showing that Pünjer’s position in the dialogue is strongly inspired by Kantian claims about existence. It is argued that Pünjer’s wavering between a broadly Meinongian and a broadly Fregean view on existence can be explained by the fact that there are Kantian remarks which seem to speak in favour of each of these views. A suggestion is then made how Kant’s claims can be interpreted in such a way that the tension which they seem to entail disappears. Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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Basaglia_214902.pdf (5.784Mb)Basaglia, Federica (2011), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Philosophical Readings ; 3 (2011), 3. - S. 61-72 Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 1
Basaglia_214902.pdf (5.784Mb) -
Därmann, Iris (2011), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Ersch. in: Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie ; 5 (2011), 2. - S. 303-325. - (Themenheft: Schwerpunkt Kulturalisierung) Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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Freitag-Epistemic.pdf (779.7Kb)Freitag, Wolfgang (2011), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: First publ. in: Acta Analytica, published online 29 January 2011 Zusammenfassung: The paper critically examines an objection to epistemic contextualism recently developed by Elke Brendel and Peter Baumann, according to which it is impossible for the contextualist to know consistently that his theory is true. I first present an outline of contextualism and its reaction to scepticism. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions for the knowability problem to arise are explored. Finally, it will be argued that contextualism does not fulfil these minimal conditions. It will be shown that the contrary view is based on a misunderstanding of what contextualists are claiming. Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 1
Freitag-Epistemic.pdf (779.7Kb) -
Mittelstraß, Jürgen (2011), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Publ. in: Trames : A Journal of the Humanities and Social Science ; 15 (2011), 4. - S. 329-338 Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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Tanyi, Attila (2011), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Publ. in: Philosophical Studies ; 152 (2011), 2. - S. 209-227 Zusammenfassung: According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have. The second argues that desires do not add to the stock of reasons the agent has for having them. Together the two theses entail that desires are based on reasons, which they transmit but to which they cannot add. In the paper I deal with a counterexample to the second premise: tie-breaking desires. I first distinguish two interesting cases and argue that only the second challenges the premise. Then I move on to analyze this challenge by focusing on Ruth Chang’s recent employment of it. I show that contrary to its counterintuitive appearance, the challenge can be sustained. However, I also argue that Chang overlooks the full potential of one particular response to the challenge: the introduction of higher-order reasons determining the normative significance of these desires. At the same time, I show that this response has a problem that Chang does not consider. As a result, the response can only partially disarm the challenge of tie-breaking desires; or not at all, depending on what significance we attribute to the counterexamples. Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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Mittelstrass, Juergen (2011), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Ersch. in: Almanach / Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften ; 160.2010 (2011). - S. 353-362 Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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Huber, Franz (2011), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: First publ. on: Oxford Bibliographies Online (www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com) 2011 Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 1
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Freitag, Wolfgang (2011), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Ersch. in: Oldenburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie 2010 ; (2011). - S. 85-99 Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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Pauen, Michael; Seebaß, Gottfried; Walter, Sven; Willaschek, Marcus (2011), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Ersch. in: Information Philosophie ; (2011), 3. - S. 42-49 Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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Erschienen in: First publ. in: The British Journal for the Philosphy of Science ; 62 (2011), 2. - pp. 343-392 Zusammenfassung: The starting point in the development of probabilistic analyses of token causation has usually been the naïve intuition that, in some relevant sense, a cause raises the probability of its effect. But there are well-known examples both of non-probability-raising causation and of probability-raising non-causation. Sophisticated extant probabilistic analyses treat many such cases correctly, but only at the cost of excluding the possibilities of direct non-probability-raising causation, failures of causal transitivity, action-at-a-distance, prevention, and causation by absence and omission. I show that an examination of the structure of these problem cases suggests a different treatment, one which avoids the costs of extant probabilistic analyses. Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 1
Glynn_probalistic.pdf (55.29Mb) -
Huber, Franz (2011), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: First publ. in: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2011), 1, pp. 207-210 Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 1
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Tanyi, Attila (2011), Artikel[more][less]
Erschienen in: Publ. in: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice ; 14 (2011), 1. - S. 101-115 Zusammenfassung: The paper begins with a well-known objection to the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Desire-Based Reasons Model or the Model). The objection holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of the argument by David Sobel. Sobel invokes a counterexample: hedonic desires, i.e. the likings and dislikings of our present conscious states. The aim of the paper is to defend the premise by bringing the alleged counterexample under its scope. I first point out that reference to hedonic desires as a counterexample presupposes a particular understanding of pleasure, which we might call desire-based. In response, following Sobel, I draw up two alternative accounts, the phenomenological and the tracking views of pleasure. Although Sobel raises several objections to both accounts, I argue in detail that the phenomenological view is not as implausible as he claims it to be, whereas the tracking view, on its best version advocated by Thomas Scanlon, collapses into the phenomenological view and is therefore also defensible. Dateien zu dieser Publikation: 0
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